

# ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)		Proposed Response to Congressional Inquiry		DD/A Registry 83-0732/7	
FROM: <i>K</i> Director of Security 4 E 60 Headquarters		EXTENSION:		NO.	
				DATE 29 JUN 1983	
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)		DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	
		RECEIVED		FORWARDED	
1. DDA 7 D 18 Hqs		30 JUN 1983		<i>[Signature]</i>	
2.					
3. D/External Affairs Att: Mr. Winchester 7 B 24 Hqs					
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COMMENTS: (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

The attached is a response to the Director of External Affairs outlining Office of Security investigative procedures and criteria to counter unauthorized disclosures. This requirement ultimately came from the House's Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights.

*[Signature]*  
Director of Security

DD/A REGISTRY  
FILE: 10-1

Regraded Unclassified When Detached From Classified Attachment

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~~Director of Security~~


DD/A REGISTRY  
FILE: 10-1

Regraded Unclassified When  
Detached From Classified  
Attachment

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29 JUN 1983



MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of External Affairs

ATTENTION: [redacted]

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VIA: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM: [redacted]

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Director of Security

SUBJECT: Proposed Response to Congressional Inquiry [redacted]

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REFERENCE: Letter to DCI dated 21 June 1983 from  
Representatives Don Edwards and  
Patricia Schroeder (attached)

1. On 23 June 1983 representatives of this Office attended a meeting of interested parties with [redacted] Deputy General Counsel, to discuss an appropriate response to referent. This Office was tasked with preparing a response to requirement number one of referent, to wit: "A description of the procedures your agency follows to detect unauthorized disclosure of national security information and the criteria used to determine whether any further action is warranted in light of such unauthorized disclosure."

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2. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) utilizes the following procedures to detect unauthorized disclosure of national security information:

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- ° Field investigations and National Agency Checks as appropriate for individuals being considered for employment, assignment, or access to CIA installations and/or information.

- ° Periodic field investigations and National Agency Checks as appropriate in conjunction with the Agency's reinvestigation program.

- ° Polygraph examinations as authorized by regulation for employment candidates and non-Agency personnel such as detailees and contractor employees prior to being hired or granted access to CIA information.

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- ° Polygraph examinations as authorized by CIA regulations in conjunction with the Agency's reinvestigation program and at other times in order to assist in resolving specific questions relating to the individual's loyalty, security posture, or suitability.

- ° Utilization of established physical security safeguards such as armed guards, patrols, alarm systems, etc., to prevent and provide response to attempts at physical penetration of the Agency's establishments by unauthorized persons.

- ° Strict control of certain categories of sensitive information and periodic inventory checks.

- ° Briefcase/package inspections designed to prevent the unauthorized removal of classified materials.

- ° The requirement that all Agency employees, as defined by regulation, and former employees submit for prior review by CIA certain materials intended for publication or oral presentation.

- ° Scanning of selected publications and program transcripts for obvious disclosures of classified information.

- ° Special security investigations to resolve specific cases involving the unauthorized disclosure of classified information by Agency-cleared personnel.

- ° An ongoing security education program which reminds and encourages employees to report violations of security regulations to appropriate Agency officials.

- ° An ongoing and close liaison relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other members of the Intelligence Community to provide support to their efforts directed at this problem and to provide lead information for further investigation by appropriate agencies in specific cases outside of CIA. ☐

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3. Should an initial investigative inquiry indicate that a disclosure of national security information has occurred, the investigation will be continued. Every effort within legal and manpower limits are utilized to bring the investigation to a logical conclusion. Identification of the responsible wrongdoer ☐

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estimating the damage to national security, and establishing preventive measures to reduce or eliminate the possibility of similar unauthorized disclosures are central to the investigative effort. [redacted]

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4. It is the understanding of this Office that responses to questions two and three will be made by the Office of General Counsel and the Office of External Affairs with appropriate coordination with the Office of Security. Please refer any questions concerning the above to [redacted]

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Attachment  
Reference

Distribution:  
Orig - Addressee  
1 - DDA

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ATTACHMENT

**ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP**

TO: (Name, org. symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)

1. EO/DOA Date: 28 JUN 1968

2. A/DOA Date: 29 JUN 1968

3. DDA Date: 30 JUN 1968

Action	File	When and Where
Approval	For Clearance	For Comment
As Requested	For Comment	Answer Reply
Complete	For Your Information	Not in
Comment	Instructions	Decision
Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, correspondence, dispatches, clearances, and similar actions.

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)

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9041-102

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)  
GPO : 1961 O - 361-528 (148)

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MICHAEL ... OHIO

**U.S. House of Representatives**  
**Committee on the Judiciary**  
Washington, D.C. 20515  
Telephone: 202-225-3951

Executive Registry  
88-112816

June 16, 1983

William J. Casey  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Casey:

The House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights and the Post Office and Civil Service Subcommittee on Civil Service are planning to hold another joint hearing on the Presidential directive on Safeguarding National Security Information. This will be an Executive Session, not open to the public.

We are writing to invite you to appear and testify on Thursday, June 30, 1983 at 9:30 a.m. in room 2237 of the Rayburn House Office Building. The purpose of the hearing is to discuss damage to the national security caused by leaks of classified information which led to the issuance of the President's Directive.

We ask that 30 copies of your statement be filed by noon, Tuesday, June 28, 1983.

Your earliest acceptance of this invitation would be appreciated.

Sincerely,

*Don Edwards*

Don Edwards  
Chairman  
Subcommittee on Civil and  
Constitutional Rights

*Pat Schroeder*

Patricia Schroeder  
Chairwoman  
Subcommittee on  
Civil Service

cc: Burton Hutchings  
Legislative Liaison

DCI  
EXEC  
FG

[illegible]

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HENRY J. MYER, ILL  
THOMAS H. KINGSLEY, OHIO  
HAROLD S. SAWYER, INCH.  
DAN LUNDREN, CALIF.  
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., WIS  
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E. CLAY SHAW, JR., FLA.  
GEORGE W. GEKAS, PA.  
MICHAEL DAWNE, OHIO

June 21, 1983



William J. Casey  
June 21, 1983  
Page Two

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C. An indication of whether the disclosure involved one or more of the following: intelligence sources and methods; identity of intelligence agents; cryptographic methods and capabilities; cryptographic intelligence; technical data about weapons or other systems; general defense or foreign policy matters.

D. An indication of whether the information disclosed involved information classified as Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret, and whether the information was Sensitive Compartmentized Information.

E. An indication of whether the damage caused to the national interest was assessed to be minimal or serious.

F. If determined, an indication of the number of individuals who had access to the information disclosed.

G. An indication of whether the information could be found or constructed from unclassified sources.

H. A description of the investigation, including an indication of whether polygraphs were used. If polygraphs were used, state how many individuals were subject to polygraph tests, whether they took the tests voluntarily, and how many of those subject to polygraphs were Presidential appointees.

I. An indication of whether the investigation led to a narrowing of possible suspects. Please state the number of suspects that the investigation focused on and the number of suspects when the investigation was terminated.

J. An indication of whether, at the conclusion of the investigation, the prime suspects were Presidential appointees.

K. An indication of whether the prime suspect(s), at the conclusion of the investigation, was a former government employee.

L. An indication of whether the Justice Department or the Information Security Oversight Office were informed of or involved in the investigation.

William J. Casey  
June 21, 1983  
Page Three

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
M. An indication of whether the source of the unauthorized disclosure was determined through the investigation and a description of the administrative or judicial sanctions sought and achieved against such individual.

N. An estimate of the cost of the investigation.


We are well aware that a full response to this letter in unclassified form may be impossible. If protection of the contents of the response is necessary, we would be willing to work with you to provide the appropriate safeguards for the response.

Thank you for your cooperation with this request.

Sincerely,



Don Edwards  
Chairman  
Subcommittee on Civil and  
Constitutional Rights



Patricia Schroeder  
Chairwoman  
Subcommittee on  
Civil Service

DE:hgw

cc: Burton Hutchings  
Legislative Liaison